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INTRODUCTION 
Presently, the tort system is used to regulate medical 
negligence litigation in Malaysia. Generally, this system 
provides for compensation only when a doctor or any 
other medical personnel assisting in the treatment of a 
patient is negligent. Previously, in determining whether a 
doctor was negligent in diagnosis, treatment and advice, 
the court had shown a deferential attitude towards 
medical judgment. This is in contrast to the attitude of 
the court towards other professions such as engineers and 
architectures where the court does not hesitate in 
questioning the appropriateness and reasoning of the 
standard practice adopted by those professionals. 
However, this deferential attitude which is encapsulated 
in the phrase “a doctor knows best” is slowly dissipating.  
This article will look at this development of the law 
by highlighting selected landmark cases that enumerate 
this change in court’s attitude [1]. It is important for 
radiologists, in Malaysia in particular, to understand the 
implication in everyday practice. 
BOLAM V FRIERN HOSPITAL (1957):  
A DOCTOR KNOWS BEST 
During this period, the general view was that the 
doctor knows best and even judges should not question 
the doctor’s opinions. The test of determining negligence 
in Bolam’s case was not to state doctors could not be 
negligent, but if the doctor had followed one of the 
responsible divergent opinions, he could not be faulted. 
Judges were not at liberty to question the validity or 
appropriateness of the opinion followed. In other words, 
the negligence of a medical practice should be 
determined by fellow medical practitioners, not judges. 
In the case of Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee [2], a voluntary psychiatric patient at Friern 
Hospital suffered bilateral “stove-in” fractures of the 
acetabula during a course of electro-convulsive therapy 
(ECT) treatment administered to him in August 1954. 
The ECT treatment was administered without a relaxant 
drug or any form of manual restraint other than to 
support the plaintiff's chin and hold his shoulders. Nurses 
were present on either side of the couch in case the 
plaintiff fell off. The plaintiff claimed damages, alleging 
that the doctor was negligent in failing to administer any 
relaxant drug or to provide at least some form of manual 
restraint and in failing to warn him of the 1:10,000 risk 
of fracture associated with the treatment.  
Although the doctor admitted that he knew that 
some doctors adopted other procedures such as providing 
a relaxant drug to patients, his training informed him 
otherwise. The patient produced an expert witness – a 
distinguished psychiatrist – who described the failure to 
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administer manual control over the patient as foolhardy. 
It was also the expert witness’ standard practice to warn 
patients of the relevant risks of ECT. The hospital 
involved, on the other hand, produced other expert 
witnesses who concurred with the procedure adopted by 
the defending doctor and who considered informing the 
patient of risk of fracture as unnecessary. Since the 
practice of doctors was supported by a body of medical 
opinions, the standard of the defending doctor’s practice 
could not be questioned and as such the doctor was 
acquitted by the jury. 
The principle enunciated in Bolam’s case 
discourages second guessing any medical judgment even 
by fellow doctors. Thus, as long as the practice of a 
doctor is supported by a body of medical opinion, it is 
not the business of the court to question the 
appropriateness of that body of opinion. Perhaps such 
judicial attitudes could be explained by the general 
attitude of the time where paternalism in all forms was 
the norm. Those in authority or possessing repository of 
professional knowledge should be given the privilege to 
decide for others. This paradigm was set to change.  
ROGERS V WHITAKER (1992): A PATIENT CAN DECIDE FOR 
HIMSELF 
Rogers v Whitaker [3], an Australian case, has been 
widely earmarked as a departure point in which the 
blatant paternalism in the previous era was jettisoned. 
Rather than allowing medical opinion to prevail even on 
patients’ decision making, the court is willing to re-
examine the appropriateness of the standard adopted by 
doctors. 
In this case, Maree Lynette Whitaker consulted an 
ophthalmic surgeon regarding her right eye, which was 
becoming almost blind. The surgeon advised her that an 
operation on that eye would probably restore significant 
sight to it. She agreed to undergo the operation, but 
unfortunately the operation did not improve her sight. 
Unfortunately, she developed sympathetic ophthalmia in 
her left eye (a recognised risk of 1 in 14,000), which 
caused her to lose all sight in the left eye. There was no 
allegation of negligent in the performance of the surgery 
itself. What was in question was the failure of the 
surgeon to inform her of the danger of sympathetic 
ophthalmia in her other eye. The Court found the 
surgeon to be negligent in failing to inform her of the 
said risk, despite the incessant inquiries of the patient on 
any side-effects of the surgery over her “good” eye. 
For the surgeon, the risk of sympathetic ophthalmia 
“was not something that came to [his] mind to mention 
to her” [3]. Expert opinions were produced both 
supporting and against the practice of informing of such 
risk. However, had the court decided to follow Bolam’s 
case, the court could not evaluate the contradictory 
medical opinions and thus a doctor would not have been 
negligent as long as his practice is in accord with at least 
one body of medical opinion. 
The Australian court stressed the importance of 
autonomous decision making of patients. In this regard, 
perhaps the human rights discourse of self determination 
and autonomy of an individual had some influence in this 
shift. Thus, the court has the ultimate responsibility to 
determine whether a practice conforms to the standard of 
reasonable care demanded by law. More importantly, this 
responsibility could not be delegated to the profession. 
BOLITHO V CITY AND HACKNEY HEALTH AUTHORITY (1997): 
JUDGES ALSO CAN THINK 
The weight given in Rogers v Whitaker where 
medical profession should not have the final say in 
determining the standard of reasonable care was repeated 
in Bolitho’s case.  
In this case [4], a two-year-old patient suffered brain 
damage as a result of cardiac arrest induced by 
respiratory failure. He was admitted for croup and had 
episodes of breathing difficulty during his stay at the St. 
Bartholomew's Hospital. In spite of calls made by the 
nurses to doctors regarding the patient’s breathing 
difficulty, none came. One of the questions that the court 
had to answer was: “Had the doctors come, should the 
doctors have intubated the patient which could have 
saved him?” The expert witnesses called to testify 
provided conflicting opinions. The trial judge surmised 
that even if the view not to intubate was unreasonable 
and illogical, she could not substitute her own views for 
those of the medical experts. This is in line with the 
Bolam’s test where a doctor is not negligent as long as 
there is a body of opinion that supported his practice. 
However, the House of Lords, the court of final 
appeal in England, disagreed with the reservations of the 
trial judge to substitute her opinion for those of the 
medical experts. The opinion of the House of Lords that 
the court can evaluate has logical basis of medical 
opinions. In weighing risks against benefits, a judge must 
be satisfied that medical experts “have directed their 
minds to the question of comparative risks and benefits 
and have reached a defensible conclusion.” [4]  
Bolitho’s case made it clear that a judge could pierce 
through the medical opinions and determine the 
reasoning of such opinions. Although in most cases, 
“distinguished experts in the field are of a particular 
opinion and will demonstrate the reasoning of that 
opinion.” However, similar to standard of care for other 
professions, the court now has the ultimate responsibility 
to determine the reasoning of such standard. 
FOO FIO NA V DR. SOO FOOK MUN (2007): THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM APPROACH 
This trend in departing away from medicalism is 
followed in Malaysia in the case of Foo Fio Na v Dr. Soo 
Fook Mun [5]. Fifty years after Bolam’s case, the Federal 
Court, the final court of appeal in Malaysia, decided that 
indeed judges could disagree with medical opinions. 
The patient in this case suffered closed dislocation 
C4 and C5 vertebrae with bilaterally locket facets after 
being involved in a car accident. An orthopaedic surgeon 
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performed a surgery where the dislocated vertebrae were 
moved to their normal positions and secured by bone 
grafting and insertion of a loop of wire. The wire loop 
was found to cause total paralysis of the patient by 
pressing on the spinal cord. Although the patient signed a 
general consent form during admission, the patient 
claimed that she was not informed of the risk of paralysis 
from the particular surgery. The court found that the 
doctor was negligent in failing to inform her of the risk. 
The Court viewed the Bolam’s approach as being 
“over protective and deferential” to the medical 
profession [5]. It is the court that determines reasoning of 
doctors’ conduct, and not the profession. The Federal 
Court opined that “the Rogers v Whitaker test would be a 
more appropriate and a viable test of this millennium.” [5] 
CONCLUSION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
The four cases cited above show that there is a shift 
in determining a reasonable standard of medical care. 
The deferential approach in yesteryears is taken over by 
a neutral, albeit still tentative, approach as in other 
professions. Below, are some principles that can be 
gleaned from the cases. 
On setting the standard of reasonable care, the 
recent cases have made it clear that the court could 
substitute its judgment for those of medical experts if 
such expert opinions fail under the court’s logical 
analysis. Thus, simply producing an expert opinion that 
agrees with the practice in question may not be enough. 
However, Bolitho’s case reminded everyone that the 
court will not be hasty in challenging the opinions of 
distinguished experts. Only in rare cases that the court 
may have to assert that it is the court that has the ultimate 
responsibility in determining a reasonable standard. 
Secondly, the principle of informed consent is here 
in Malaysia. A general consent form is meaningless if 
the patient is not informed of relevant risks of the 
procedure. For example, a radiologist not informing the 
patient the possibility of developing an anaphylactic 
shock after iodine contrast intravenous injection [6]. The 
important consideration is on the ability of the patient to 
make his own decision after receiving relevant 
information from the doctors. Whether a particular 
information is relevant depends also from the point of 
view of the patient, and not necessarily the opinions of 
the doctors. 
Thirdly, the court may no longer give the benefit of 
doubt to doctors in cases of missing X-ray films. The 
court will make adverse inference as allowed by law if 
doctors or hospitals fail to produce X-ray films or 
documents in the court [7]. As in other cases, the court 
may make adverse inference against doctors. 
Fourthly, the court subscribed to prevailing 
perception that compared with other professions that the 
medical profession in some instances failed “to stand up 
to the wrong doings” of their brethren [5]. The impact of 
the effect of this perception to the approach taken by the 
court is not clear. Perhaps it may lend credence to the 
need for the court to form its own opinion about a 
reasonable standard of care in diagnosis, treatment and 
advice. 
Thus, although there were differences of expert 
opinions with regard to a reasonable decision of a 
vascular interventional radiologist to proceed with a 
renal angioplasty after being aware of an anatomical 
variation, a court found that the radiologist had taken all 
the reasonable steps necessary to ensure proper 
placement of the balloon [8]. 
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